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consequentialists who seek to maximize these, just as primitive sufferings 
are presupposed by the effort to minimize these both in human society 
and among sentient beings in general. On Forrest’s account, divine beauty 
seems to consist in both God’s ability to bring our world into existence and 
to lovingly respond to creaturely joys and sufferings once it gets going. 
Divine beauty, it seems, becomes apparent to us when we try to view the 
cosmos as a valuable whole and in the long run. Consequentialism actu-
ally supports a theistic worldview.
Unfortunately, Forrest denigrates perfect being theology, whether 
found in classical theists like katherin rogers or in a neoclassical theist 
like (myself or) Hartshorne. The Anselmian effort to reach clarity regard-
ing that than which no greater can be conceived is criticized by Forrest 
because, although God may become perfectly loving over time, such per-
fection is not there from the beginning. That is, what is really distinctive 
about the author’s approach is not that he is a developmental theist, but 
that he denies that what we mean by “God” is a being that is by its very 
nature perfect. 
I would be remiss if I did not mention in closing that there is not the 
slightest hint of dogmatism in the book. Throughout the book Forrest is 
genuinely interested in productive dialectical exchange with fellow the-
ists. It would be a mistake, I think, for philosophical theists to put this 
book at the bottom of their reading lists.
John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture, by John Marshall. 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. viii + 767. $123.00 (cloth)
GArY De kreY, St. Olaf College
Little is more repugnant to the liberal mind than the employment of phys-
ical coercion to punish, interrogate, or re-educate those who hold stigma-
tized political or religious views. Yet nothing was more fundamental to 
medieval and early modern european culture, whether roman Catholic 
or Protestant, than the idea that the preservation of the faith and the se-
curity of the state required severe means to reclaim “heretics” and “schis-
matics.” John Marshall’s massive study investigates the transition from 
the general acceptance of rationales for the proscription and punishment 
of religious heterodoxy to the development of compelling arguments for 
universal religious toleration. He also inquires into the historical origins 
of the early enlightenment. For Marshall, these questions are the same. 
Arguments for religious toleration became critical challenges to the domi-
nant early modern intellectual and cultural paradigm and permitted more 
enlightened attitudes to emerge, at least among some Europeans.
Marshall places Locke and other early enlightenment advocates of re-
ligious toleration in the broadest conceivable historical contexts. Almost 
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two-thirds of the book is taken up with the history of religious coercion 
before the breakthrough of more tolerant ideas in the 1680s and the 1690s. 
After surveying persecution in later seventeenth-century england, France, 
and the Netherlands, Marshall turns his attention to the justifications for 
such coercion that had developed over the centuries. He begins with the 
church fathers, the councils, and the early creeds that established Chris-
tian dogma and called for its defense, against those who actively dissented 
from it, with harsh corporal punishments. working through late medieval 
thought and through the writings of the “magisterial” reformers, Mar-
shall explains how understandings of heresy and schism became associ-
ated intellectually with such other anathematized categories or behaviors 
as blasphemy, sedition, witchcraft, sodomy, libertinism, and atheism. He 
also examines how Catholic and Protestant authorities repeatedly recycled 
these understandings. The language in which religious differences were 
condemned became richly multi-textured as “heresy” acquired negative, 
gendered connotations and was metaphorically assimilated to such other 
disasters as pestilence and the plague, pollution, and monstrous births. 
In the course of Marshall’s analysis of the language of intolerance, many 
textbook assumptions fall by the wayside, and Christian thought before 
the enlightenment is presented as fundamentally intolerant. erasmus, it 
seems, was no more a supporter of leniency towards heretics than Luther, 
Calvin, or Counter-reformation Catholic authorities. A more tolerant cul-
ture did develop in the Protestant Netherlands, but the limits to Dutch 
toleration were many. Leading Dutch reformed clergy begrudged the 
practice of toleration and remained hostile to Catholicism, Anabaptism, 
Arminianism, and anti-Trinitarianism. Those outside the public church 
were generally permitted private worship only and suffered from nu-
merous legal disabilities. Persecuted late-seventeenth-century French re-
formed Protestant theologians like Pierre Jurieu had no more patience for 
intellectual diversity within their ranks: Arminianism remained as suspect 
to them as to most early seventeenth-century Calvinists. In england, ad-
vocacy of liberty for conscience by mid-seventeenth century Independents 
was limited by an insistence upon Trinitarian belief, by anti-Catholicism, 
and by fears that a general toleration would open the floodgates of Socini-
anism, atheism, antinomianism, and libertinism. even the anti-Trinitarian 
John Milton was “markedly intolerant in his opposition to Catholicism,” 
(p. 331) while the more tolerant Levellers accomplished little. Attitudes 
towards Jews remained guarded everywhere; and positive perceptions 
of Muslims were largely restricted to anti-Trinitarians who viewed Islam 
through a Unitarian lens. 
Tolerationist arguments did circulate before the Enlightenment; but 
they largely developed within the ranks of the persecuted themselves—the 
Anabaptists, anti-Trinitarians, and other sectarians. Intellectual leaders of 
the dwindling Arminian or remonstrant community in the Netherlands 
also embraced and improved upon the limited tolerationist arguments 
of Hugo Grotius. The work of the tolerant Arminian writer Simon epis-
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copius, for instance, was republished and promoted by the remonstrant 
professor Philipp van Limborch, John Locke’s Dutch friend and host in 
the 1680s. However, neither the anti-predestinarian nor the semi-Socinian 
elements of Arminian thought did much to advance the acceptability of 
toleration. Dutch Arminianism nevertheless influenced Locke and many 
other figures in the conversational circles that Locke encountered in the 
Netherlands.
Marshall’s lengthy treatment of the politics and culture of european 
religious coercion, which reached a climax in the 1680s, permits him to 
emphasize the significance of the coincident intellectual breakthrough 
made by Locke, Pierre bayle, Gilbert burnet, and their Dutch and French 
friends. As Marshall moves—in the final third of the book—to examining 
the relationships, publications, shared ideas, and differences of these men, 
he also addresses the origins and nature of the early enlightenment. He 
does this through extensive juxtapositions of the tolerationist arguments 
of Locke, Limborch, burnet, bayle, Jean Le Clerc, Adriaan van Paets, 
Charles le Cène, Isaac Papin, and others. Through their intentional col-
laboration, these advocates of a new approach to religious disagreement 
formed the center of the “republic of letters,” an informal association of 
like-minded thinkers who drew upon and promoted each other’s writings. 
recent enlightenment historians have seen them as central in the deliber-
ate launching of a more tolerant, civil, and polite culture. Marshall finds 
in them not only many of the ideas of the mature enlightenment but also a 
self-conscious attempt to recover “primitive Christianity” from what they 
saw as its millennium-long bondage to the corruptions of Constantine, 
the bishops of rome, and the magisterial Protestant reformers. Although 
Marshall is principally interested in situating Locke within this early en-
lightenment ethos, he also provides great insight into Pierre bayle. bayle’s 
Philosophical Commentary (1686–1688), his Historical and Critical Dictionary 
(1697), and his journal, Nouvelles de la République des Lettres, helped define 
the values and arguments of the emerging “tolerationist associations.” 
Sweeping through centuries and digesting the work of scores of major 
thinkers, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture will provoke 
discussion for years. All consideration of the early enlightenment and of 
the intellectual breakthrough of arguments for toleration must now start 
with Marshall’s book. Yet both its overly ambitious scope and its prolix 
style will discourage many readers. The critical final third of the study 
can profitably be considered independently of the rest by those chiefly 
interested in the early enlightenment and in Locke’s religious thought. 
As tedious as Marshall’s method of compiling comparable quotations can 
become, each author under consideration—and especially Locke—can be 
understood here as part of an innovative ensemble of critics of Christian 
“orthodoxy” whose publications marked a decisive departure in european 
thought. Few Locke scholars have ever read as deeply and as insightfully 
into the work of Locke’s continental friends as Marshall. His evaluation of 
Locke’s writings as part of the republic of letters is fresh and compelling, 
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and his analysis of the early enlightenment challenges Jonathan Israel’s 
more Spinoza-centered interpretation.1
A book of such scope, which touches upon the work of multi-disci-
plinary cadres of scholars, will arouse criticism from diverse academic 
quarters, especially since Marshall steps on many toes. Students of early 
modern Christian thought, for instance, will find little nuance and much 
selectivity in his attachment of almost all Trinitarian defenders of church 
establishments to an intellectual template associating “heresy” with all 
manner of moral turpitude. Marshall does not always carefully distinguish 
between formulaic and more intentional rhetorical usages of such pejora-
tive categories as libertinism and atheism; and his discussion of these pe-
jorative categories often overshadows the core theological differences that 
provoked their employment in the first place. He also treats European cul-
ture from the late middle ages through the era of Louis XIV in rather static 
terms. Oddly, for a scholar who has contributed much to the study of late 
seventeenth-century english political thought, Marshall is more adroit in 
placing Locke in the continental intellectual context than in the context of 
english ideas about religious coercion and liberty of conscience. because 
he judges all early modern arguments against religious coercion by the 
enlightenment standard of universal religious toleration, he minimizes the 
contributions of previous english advocates of conscience to the eventual 
breakthrough of tolerationist ideas. He notes the importance of sectarian, 
Quaker, and Leveller authors, for instance; but he does not explore them 
in the depth he accords to the Dutch Arminian tradition. He has previ-
ously examined the influence upon Locke of the irenic Latitudinarian An-
glicans and Cambridge Platonists, but he does not here revisit the place of 
either group in the development of english tolerationist thought.2 
Marshall also regards restoration Presbyterian and Independent au-
thors as offering only limited and self-interested pleas for conscience or 
for comprehension within the established church. Yet the early enlight-
enment insistence that religious oppression—rather than toleration of 
religious diversity—was more likely to cause civil dissension was com-
monplace among Locke’s restoration dissenting contemporaries by the 
1680s. Slingsby bethel, Sir Charles wolseley, and other nonconformist 
spokesmen popularized the arguments that conscience is directly respon-
sible to God rather than to the civil magistrate and that persuasion of the 
mind, rather than coercion of the body, is the Christian means for over-
coming religious differences.3 Similarly, the anti-clericalism of the repub-
lic of letters was anticipated not only by English civil war sectarians but 
also by such Restoration dissenting figures as Andrew Marvell and the 
1J. I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750 (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
2 J. Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), esp. chap. 3.
3For further analysis, see G. S. De krey, “rethinking the restoration: Dissenting Cases for 
Conscience, 1667–1672,” The Historical Journal 38 (1995), pp. 53–83.
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Presbyterian doyen richard baxter, whose assaults upon “the carnal and 
aspiring part of the clergy” matched the rhetorical intensity of subsequent 
savants.4 Neither would the early enlightenment division between a toler-
ant “primitive Christianity” and an intolerant Constantinian Christianity 
have been news to baxter or to Marvell, who saw the Council of Nicaea as 
imposing ideas unknown to earlier Christians.5 Even Locke’s definition of 
a church as a “voluntary society” was comparable to that of baxter, who 
maintained that nobody becomes a member of a church except through 
“his own consent.”6 
The point to be made about dissenting arguments for conscience is not 
that they directly influenced Locke, a suggestion Marshall has ably re-
futed, but rather that these authors and their Anglican opponents together 
infused the english public sphere with arguments about conscience and 
toleration. A variety of pre-enlightenment writers against coercion—dis-
senters, Latitudinarians, and Cambridge Platonists among them—made 
liberty of conscience for Protestants a central issue in english political and 
intellectual life before the 1680s. The point is important because these au-
thors and schools of authors were generally more conventional in their 
Christianity than Locke. Marshall is so insistent that “orthodox” Christi-
anity and “tolerance” were mutually exclusive from the late roman em-
pire through the 1680s that he cannot see the proliferation within british 
Protestant thought of many of the motifs from which Locke and others 
would fashion cases for virtually unlimited religious toleration. Moreover, 
the acceptance of tolerationist arguments by whig, Latitudinarian, low-
church, and dissenting political elements—all critical in the social ground-
ing of early Enlightenment attitudes in England—cannot be explained 
solely by analyzing Locke and the republic of letters. Marshall’s neglect 
of English dissenting thought reflects his too ready agreement with those 
historians who have artificially narrowed the ranks of the dissenting and 
partially conforming population. It also reflects the absolute dichotomy he 
establishes between tolerance and intolerance, although his own evidence 
suggests that these stances are best understood not only as ideal opposites 
but also as terminal points on a broad spectrum of nuanced positions that 
often show varying shades of each. 
All criticism aside, Marshall’s treatment of Locke’s mature religious 
thought demands respect. Locke’s emphasis upon a few fundamental be-
liefs as the core of Christianity was part of a broader, collaborative ef-
fort to overcome persecution and polarization about religious differences. 
Locke’s non-dogmatic reformulation of Christianity appears here as an ef-
fort to defend the heart of Christianity—indeed, to revive non-dogmatic 
“primitive Christianity”—rather than only as an attempt to reduce the 
4[Andrew Marvell], Mr. Smirke; or, the Divine in Mode (1676); Richard Baxter, Church-His-
tory of the Government of Bishops and their Councils Abbreviated (1680), p. 25.
5[Andrew Marvell], A Short Historical Essay, touching General Councils, Creeds, and Imposi-
tion in Religion in Mr. Smirke, p. 60.
6richard baxter, The Nonconformists Plea for Peace (1679), p. 31.
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faith according to the dictates of reason. In promoting agreement about 
Christian fundamentals, and in emphasizing the voluntary nature of reli-
gious association, Locke was acting in the spirit and reflecting the ethos of 
the amicable and humane republic of letters. Like his fellow writers, Locke 
was aware of how previous arguments for toleration had been damaged 
by charges of Socinianism; and this awareness ensured his own discretion 
on the subject of the Trinity. And Locke’s toleration was generally extend-
ed to Jews, to roman Catholics, and to Muslims, although his approaches 
to each of these traditions were, according to Marshall, couched in charac-
teristically careful language. Marshall supports the argument that, while 
Locke denied toleration to Catholics who honored papal political author-
ity, he nevertheless accepted the private worship of Catholics in Protestant 
states who rejected such authority. And he similarly argues that, although 
Locke denied toleration, on the same grounds, to the Islamic followers of 
the Mufti of Constantinople, he otherwise favored the toleration of Islam. 
For these and other approaches to Locke’s religion, Marshall’s study will 
long be essential reading.
God and the Reach of Reason: C. S. Lewis, David Hume, and Bertrand Russell, 
by erik J. wielenberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. 
vii + 243. $75.00 (hardback), $21.99 (paper).
GreGOrY bASSHAM, king’s College (Pa.)
C. S. Lewis wrote extensively on philosophical issues. In books such as 
The Problem of Pain (1940), The Abolition of Man (1943), Miracles (1947), and 
Mere Christianity (1952), Lewis wrote at length about the problem of evil, 
the existence of God, the objectivity of moral judgments, the credibility 
of miracles, naturalism vs. supernaturalism, and other classic philosophi-
cal problems. Lewis, of course, was not a professional philosopher, and 
his apologetical books were directed at a general audience rather than at 
regular readers of Mind or Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Neverthe-
less, it can be asked whether Lewis’s philosophical writings are worthy of 
serious attention by professional philosophers.
Until very recently, the prevailing view has been that they are not. 
Lewis’s writings were mostly ignored by professional philosophers until 
the late 1970s, when Christian philosophers such as richard Purtill, Peter 
kreeft, and Gilbert Meilaender began urging that they be taken seriously. 
In the mid-80s, John beversluis’s sharply critical book, C. S. Lewis and the 
Rational Search for Religion (Eerdmans, 1985; rev. edition, 2007), seemed to 
many to clinch the case for seeing Lewis as a philosophical lightweight.
Today, the tide has turned, and there are a slew of books that make 
the case for Lewis’s merits as a philosopher. Among the most notable are: 
David Baggett, Gary R. Habermas, and Jerry L. Walls, eds., C. S. Lewis as 
